Partial Quashing of FIRs: Navigating the Jurisprudential Divide

Introduction

Few areas of criminal procedure test the balance between judicial discretion and public policy as starkly as the partial quashing of FIRs. When an FIR ropes in multiple accused or invokes a bouquet of offences, courts are often asked: can some allegations or some accused be carved out and discharged on the basis of settlement or lack of evidence, while proceedings continue against the rest? The answer has not been uniform, with the jurisprudence oscillating between caution and pragmatism.

The Legal Backdrop: Section 482 CrPC /Section 528 BNSS

The High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (and now Section 528 of the BNSS) are the foundation for this debate. These powers are designed not to create new jurisdiction, but to ensure that justice is not subverted by procedural rigidity. The Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012 ) captured this spirit, holding that criminal proceedings arising from essentially private disputes could be quashed even if the offences were formally non-compoundable. At the same time, it drew a red line: serious offences with a societal dimension — such as sexual violence, corruption, or organized crime — could never be subject to compromise.

Why Partial Quashing Became Relevant

In practice, FIRs are often drafted expansively. Complainants, sometimes out of caution and sometimes out of strategy, name multiple accused and invoke multiple sections of the IPC. This creates a dilemma: should courts allow the criminal process to run its full course against all accused, or should they tailor relief for those against whom the dispute is truly private, or where compromise has been reached? The question of partial quashing arises precisely in this grey zone.

Judicial Responses: A Tale of Two Approaches

The Restrictive Approach

Some High Courts have been reluctant to allow piecemeal quashing. For instance, in Navdeep Kumar v. State of Haryana (2014)  and Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) , the Punjab & Haryana High Court refused to quash proceedings only against some accused, reasoning that allegations were inseverable and that judicial propriety barred such fragmentation. Similarly, in Manjinder Kaur v. State of Punjab (2017) , a compromise with only one accused was held insufficient, since identical allegations ran across all co-accused. This approach stresses consistency and avoids parallel outcomes in the same case.

The Pragmatic Approach

On the other hand, both the Supreme Court and several High Courts have adopted a more flexible lens. In Lovely Salhotra v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) , the Supreme Court recognised that where allegations are severable, an FIR can indeed be quashed qua some accused alone. Building on this, courts such as the Delhi High Court in Sunil Tomar v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Karan Sharma v. State of NCT of Delhi (2023) , as well as the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Jasveer Kaur v. State of Punjab (2024) , allowed partial quashing where compromise was genuine and the roles of the accused were distinguishable. The Kerala High Court in Muhammed Sufaid v. State of Kerala and Madras High Court in Rajesh v. State have also embraced this pragmatic view, permitting quashing against specific accused whose involvement was peripheral or already resolved.

The Settlement Factor

A consistent thread across cases is the weight accorded to settlement. Where disputes have a civil or matrimonial flavour, courts have leaned towards giving effect to a compromise. This was visible in Gian Singh and later reaffirmed in Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi (2022) . By contrast, in Altaf v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025) , the Delhi High Court strongly rejected quashing under the POCSO Act despite the purported settlement. Importantly, the Court noted that the compromise was struck not with the minor victim herself but with her parents, which carried no legal weight. The judgment underscored that in cases of sexual offences against children, no private arrangement can erase the public wrong. This highlights that the identity of the party entering into a compromise is crucial: while settlement may matter in civil-flavoured disputes, it is irrelevant where the offence violates societal interests.

Timing: Before or After Chargesheet?

Another debate has been whether quashing can be sought after the investigation culminates in a chargesheet. Earlier hesitation has given way to a more practical stance: courts now recognise that the stage of proceedings is immaterial. Karan Sharma (Delhi HC, 2023) is illustrative — the Court permitted partial quashing even post-challan, reasoning that forcing prosecution despite settlement would serve no purpose.

When Partial Quashing Will Not Be Granted

Courts remain firm in refusing partial quashing where:

• The offences are heinous or of societal concern (rape, POCSO, terrorism, corruption)

• Allegations are identical across the accused, making severance artificial

• The compromise appears collusive or incomplete

The Altaf case is a strong reminder that settlements engineered in sensitive offences cannot bind the State, and attempts to privatise justice in such contexts will be rebuffed.

Conclusion

The jurisprudence on partial quashing is not static; it is steadily evolving as courts grapple with the competing demands of individual justice and collective societal interest. The current trend indicates that High Courts and the Supreme Court are moving towards a more pragmatic and fact-sensitive approach, distinguishing between disputes that are essentially private and those that strike at the heart of public order.

The lesson is that legal strategy must be carefully tailored: any plea for partial quashing should rest on clear severability of allegations, the genuineness of the settlement, and the absence of wider social harm. A one-size-fits-all approach will no longer suffice, and each case requires a calibrated assessment of its factual context and judicial trends.

REFERENCES:

1 Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : AIR 2012 SC 2829.

2 Navdeep Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 21520 : (2014) 3 RCR (Cri) 123 (P&H).

3 Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 3517 : (2015) 3 RCR (Cri) 822 (P&H).

4 Manjinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2017 SCC OnLine P&H 67446 : (2017) 4 RCR (Cri) 765 (P&H).

5 Lovely Salhotra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 391 : AIR 2018 SC 4863.

6 Sunil Tomar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 150 : (2022) 2 HCC (Del) 150.

7 Karan Sharma v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 875.

8 Jasveer Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine P&H 2699.

9 Muhammed Sufaid v. State of Kerala, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 24966 : (2016) 4 KLT 425.

10 Rajesh v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 26256 : (2018) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 98.

11Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1030 : (2022) 9 SCC 561.

12Altaf v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2363.