PRIVACY VERSUS FAIR TRIAL: ADMISSIBILITY OF WHATSAPP CHATS IN MATRIMONIAL DISPUTES UNDER INDIAN LAW

ABSTRACT

The digitalization of private communication, especially via instant messaging platforms like WhatsApp, has created a new evidentiary landscape for matrimonial litigation in India. In 2025, two significant decisions, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Smt. Anjali Sharma v. Raman Upadhyay (16 June 2025) and the Supreme Court in Vibhor Garg v. Neha (14 July 2025), affirmed that WhatsApp chats and secretly recorded spousal conversations may be admissible in matrimonial proceedings in appropriate circumstances. These decisions foreground a tension between two constitutional values: the right to informational privacy under Article 21 and the judicial duty to discover the truth and secure just outcomes in family disputes. This article offers a doctrinal analysis of the relevant provisions (notably Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 14 of the Family Courts Act), and proposes targeted reforms- procedural, statutory and technological to balance privacy with fair trial imperatives. The central proposition is that a two-stage model (reception under Section 14 FCA; proof and authentication under the Evidence Act) is workable but requires statutory clarification, proportionality-based judicial guidelines, and practical authentication mechanisms to prevent misuse and protect dignity.

I. Introduction

Matrimonial litigation frequently rests on facts that are private, episodic, and emotionally charged. Until recently, courts relied largely on witness testimony, contemporaneous letters, and circumstantial evidence to establish claims such as cruelty, adultery, and desertion. The advent of smartphones and encrypted messaging apps has changed that: instant messages, photographs, voice notes and call logs routinely accompany petitions and counter-petitions, and often form the most direct evidence of conduct. WhatsApp is central to this shift given its ubiquitous use in India.

In mid-2025 two decisions became focal points in the debate over how family courts should treat electronic communications. On 16 June 2025, the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior Bench) in Smt. Anjali Sharma v. Raman Upadhyay held that WhatsApp chats exchanged between spouses may be received in matrimonial proceedings under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, even when procured without the consent of the other spouse (M.P. No. 3395/2023). On 14 July 2025, the Supreme Court in Vibhor Garg v. Neha held that secretly recorded spousal phone conversations could, in appropriate circumstances, be admitted in matrimonial proceedings, observing that the right to privacy is not absolute and that spousal privilege under Section 122 of the Evidence Act does not automatically bar such evidence when spouses are averse to each other.

These rulings reflect an orientation toward evidentiary pragmatism: relevance and truth-finding are primary. Yet they also raise significant concerns. Prima facie admissibility risks incentivising domestic surveillance, hacking, and coercive collection of private data. Moreover, flexibilising admissibility without safeguarding reliability threatens miscarriages of justice based on fabricated or manipulated records. Accordingly, the central question addressed in this paper is how Indian law should reconcile privacy with fair adjudication in matrimonial disputes involving digital records.

II. Doctrinal Framework

A. Constitutional Framework: Privacy and Proportionality

The modern constitutional protection of privacy in India was decisively recognised in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy is intrinsic to Article 21's guarantee of life and personal liberty. The Court characterized privacy broadly, encompassing informational autonomy, dignity, and the freedom to make intimate decisions without unwarranted intrusion and applied a proportionality framework for permissible restrictions. This proportionality approach is central to adjudicating tensions between privacy and evidentiary needs in matrimonial cases. The constitutional foundation for privacy in India rests on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1. A nine-judge bench unanimously affirmed that privacy is a fundamental right intrinsic to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The judgment emphasized informational privacy, autonomy, and decisional freedom, all of which bear directly on matrimonial disputes involving electronic communications. Where spouses seek to rely on WhatsApp chats or other private correspondence, the doctrinal tension arises between the constitutional guarantee of privacy and the evidentiary need to ensure a fair trial. Subsequent family law cases, such as Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari v. Nagaphanender Rayala (2008) and Vibhor Garg v. Neha (2025), can be read as attempts to operationalize or limit the principles recognized in Puttaswamy within the specific evidentiary context of matrimonial litigation.

B. Evidence Law:Section 65B and Authentication of Electronic Records

Electronic records were formally made evidence‑capable by the Information Technology Act and corresponding amendments to the Evidence Act. Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act provides a certification regime: secondary electronic records are admissible if accompanied by a certificate describing the device, the manner of production and a statement regarding the integrity of the record. The Supreme Court’s decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) reaffirmed the centrality of Section 65B and clarified that, in routine circumstances, compliance with the certification requirement is mandatory for admission of electronic evidence.

C. Illegally Obtained Evidence: The Pooran Mal Principle

Indian jurisprudence has traditionally allowed the reception of evidence even if procured by irregular or improper means, focusing on relevance rather than the method of procurement. In Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation), Income Tax (1974), the Supreme Court held that illegality in acquisition does not automatically render evidence inadmissible; instead, the court should consider the probative value and the circumstances surrounding acquisition. This approach contrasts with the American exclusionary rule in criminal law but reflects a purposive, truth‑seeking orientation in Indian civil and quasi‑criminal contexts.

D. Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984: Reception v. Proof

Section 14 FCA provides: 'A Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that, in its opinion, may assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act.' This provision was enacted to afford Family Courts procedural flexibility in dealing with sensitive matters that may lack conventional documentary proof.

Critically, the statutory language contemplates a two‑stage process. Reception is the power to allow material into the court’s record; it does not dispense with the requirement to evaluate authenticity and weight. Where electronic records are concerned, the court’s admission of such material under Section 14 should generally be followed by scrutiny (forensic, corroborative or certification under Section 65B) before the material is treated as decisive. The Madhya Pradesh High Court’s June 2025 ruling in Smt. Anjali Sharma exemplifies the two‑stage approach in the family law context.

E. Matrimonial Law Context: Grounds and Evidence

Matrimonial disputes frequently concern conduct that occurs in private. Grounds such as cruelty, adultery, and desertion often turn on contemporaneous communications and conduct. Electronic records messages, voice notes, call logs can therefore be decisive. The juridical challenge is to admit reliably authenticated material while guarding against fabrication, misuse, or invasive surveillance practices that may themselves amount to abuse.

III. Judicial Developments and Reasoning

A. Trajectory: High Courts and the Supreme Court on e‑evidence

Indian courts have gradually adapted to the digital era. Early High Court decisions admitted emails and other electronic communications with caution. The Supreme Court’s Arjun Panditrao (2020) clarified Section 65B compliance. Following Arjun Panditrao, several High Courts (including the Delhi High Court in Dell International) have insisted on formal authentication for WhatsApp chats in ordinary proceedings, while Family Courts have at times relied on Section 14 of the FCA to receive such material for consideration. The legal landscape remains a mix of pragmatic reception and insistence on authentication.

B. Andhra Pradesh High Court- Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari v. Nagaphanender Rayala (AIR 2008 AP 98)

In Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari v. Nagaphanender Rayala (AIR 2008 AP 98), the Andhra Pradesh High Court considered whether emails allegedly accessed by a husband from his wife’s private account could be relied upon in matrimonial proceedings. The Court held that the unauthorized access of a spouse’s private correspondence amounted to a violation of her right to privacy and that such material was inadmissible. Although this decision predates the Supreme Court’s recognition of privacy as a fundamental right in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), it foreshadowed similar constitutional values by emphasizing autonomy and dignity in the matrimonial context. When read alongside the later Vibhor Garg v. Neha (2025), which adopts a proportionality-based approach to admitting private communications, Rayala illustrates the doctrinal transition from strict exclusion to nuanced balancing in Indian family law jurisprudence.

C. Madhya Pradesh High Court -Smt. Anjali Sharma v. Raman Upadhyay (M.P. No. 3395/2023; 16 June 2025)

In Smt. Anjali Sharma v. Raman Upadhyay (M.P. No. 3395/2023), a single judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior Bench) considered whether WhatsApp chats tendered by a spouse could be admitted in matrimonial proceedings where the chats were said to have been procured without the other spouse’s consent. The Court observed that Section 14 FCA permits the Family Court to receive material that assists it to decide the dispute and held that the Family Court could receive the WhatsApp chats for consideration. Importantly, the Court emphasised that reception did not equal proof: the Family Court would still have to test authenticity and probative value before relying on the chats to grant relief.

D. Supreme Court -Vibhor Garg v. Neha (Supreme Court; 14 July 2025)

In Vibhor Garg v. Neha, the Supreme Court considered whether secretly recorded spousal telephone conversations could be admitted in matrimonial litigation. The Court held that Section 122 of the Evidence Act which protects communications during marriage does not operate as an absolute bar where spouses are adverse parties. The Court permitted admission of secret recordings in appropriate circumstances, subject to assessment of relevance, reliability (including voice identification where necessary) and proportionality. The Court emphasised that recordings obtained by private parties (i.e., one spouse) are to be assessed differently from unlawful state surveillance or third‑party interceptions. The judgment is available on IndianKanoon and covered by major legal reporting services; practitioners should consult the full text for paragraph‑level reasoning and any procedural qualifiers.

E. Delhi High Court- Dell International Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. Adeel Feroze (W.P.(C) 4733/2024; Order dated 2 July 2024)

In Dell International, the Delhi High Court considered a writ petition in which WhatsApp chats had been produced in a commercial matter. The Court held that electronic records (including WhatsApp screenshots) could not be treated as admissible evidence in the absence of the certificate mandated by Section 65B of the Evidence Act. Its ruling reinforces the point that Section 65B remains an important safeguard and that courts must take care when treating screenshots and unverified message captures as proof.

F. Conflicting but Converging Trends

Taken together, the cases indicate a pragmatic, two‑stage path: courts will receive electronic communications to avoid procedural blindness, particularly in family disputes, but they will insist on rigorous testing (forensic examination, metadata, certification) before such material is given decisive weight. Family Courts’ statutory flexibility under Section 14 therefore operates in tension with the Evidence Act’s authentication regime; judicial practice is evolving to reconcile the two.

IV. Comparative Perspectives: United Kingdom and United States

Comparative experience offers useful lessons. In the United Kingdom, civil and family courts admit electronic material and rely on case management tools (in‑camera hearings, redaction, sealed exhibits) to protect privacy. The United States draws a sharper distinction: state action that unlawfully obtains evidence triggers exclusionary rules in criminal cases, but private recordings may be admissible in civil contexts depending on consent statutes. India’s emergent approach combines pragmatic reception with a growing emphasis on authentication and proportionality.

V. Policy and Normative Considerations

Adapting evidence law to digital realities requires sensitivity to three core risks: (1) domestic surveillance and coercion, (2) fabrication and manipulation of electronic records, and (3) trauma and dignity harms when intimate communications are exposed. These risks call for targeted procedural safeguards rather than categorical exclusion or unbridled admissibility.

VI. Policy Recommendations

1. Statutory clarification: Amend the Evidence Act or the Family Courts Act to clarify that Section 14 FCA governs reception but that proof and weight are governed by the Evidence Act, including Section 65B for electronic records.

2. Proportionality test: Courts should apply a structured proportionality test for admission of private communications: direct relevance, necessity, proportionality of intrusion, and availability of less intrusive alternatives.

3. Practical authentication mechanisms: Establish court‑appointed forensic verification cells or authorise expedited certification processes for family courts to verify metadata and device integrity.

4. Sanctions for illicit acquisition: Strengthen sanctions for hacking, spyware use, and fabrication, while ensuring victims can produce probative evidence of abuse.

5. Harmonize with data protection law: Clarify the interaction between the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 and admissibility rules to regulate interpersonal data acquisition.

6. Judicial training and model directions: Equip Family Court judges with tools and produce model practice directions for the reception and handling of digital evidence.

VII. Conclusion

The challenges posed by digital communications in matrimonial litigation are real and pressing. The judicial trend in 2025 exemplified by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Supreme Court leans toward admitting digital communications where they are relevant and reliable, while demanding robust mechanisms to test authenticity. A careful, two‑stage approach (reception under Section 14; proof under Section 65B and related evidentiary standards) paired with statutory clarification, forensic capacity and procedural safeguards can help achieve the twin goals of truth‑seeking and protection of dignity.

REFERENCES:

1. Smt. Anjali Sharma v. Raman Upadhyay M.P. No. 3395/2023 (Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior Bench, 16 June 2025).

2. Vibhor Garg v. Neha Supreme Court of India, Order dated 14 July

3. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1

4. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1

5. Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation), Income Tax (1974) 1 SCC 345

6. Dell International Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. Adeel Feroze & Ors. W.P.(C) 4733/2024; Order dated 2 July 2024

7. Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari v. Nagaphanender Rayala AIR 2008 AP 98 (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 20 Dec 2007)

8. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Section 65B (Electronic records) AND Section 122 (Communications during marriage)

9. Family Courts Act, 1984 Section 14

10. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023